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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL J. BERNSTEIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT  
OF COMMERCE, et al.,

Defendants.

C 95-00582 MHP

**DECLARATION OF  
BRUCE SCHNEIER  
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S  
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

HEARING DATE: August 2, 2002

TIME:

JUDGE: Marilyn Hall Patel

I, BRUCE SCHNEIER, hereby declare:

1. I am the Chief Technical Officer of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., a network-security monitoring company I founded in 1999. Before that, I was the President of Counterpane Systems, a consulting firm specializing in cryptography and computer security. I am the author of seven books on cryptography and computer security, including Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C, the second edition of which was

1 published in 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, and of E-Mail Security, published in 1995 by John  
2 Wiley & Sons. I have published dozens of academic papers on cryptography, and have  
3 lectured on the subject around the world. I have been a member of the board of directors of  
4 the International Association for Cryptologic Research, and have chaired several cryptography  
5 research conferences.

6 2. Except as expressly stated below, I have personal knowledge of the facts stated  
7 herein. If called upon to testify, I would competently testify to these facts.

### 8 **The One-Time Pad**

9 3. There is an encryption system, called the “one-time pad,” that is provably  
10 unbreakable.

11 4. The system is suitable for hand use, and can be adapted for computers. Both the  
12 hand system and the computer system can be mathematically proven to be secure. That is, it  
13 is mathematically impossible for someone to break a message encrypted with a one-time pad.  
14 This impossibility is not based on technology, or understanding, or any future mathematical  
15 breakthroughs. A one-time pad is provably secure.

16 5. The hand system involves a key the same length as the message. The key is a  
17 series of letters. These key letters are “added” to the message letters “modulo 26”:  $A + A = B$ ,  
18  $A + B = C$ ,  $A + C = D$ , ...,  $A + Z = A$ ,  $B + A = C$ ,  $B + B = D$ , etc. For example, if the  
19 message is ONETIMEPAD and the key sequence is TBFRGFARFM, then the encrypted  
20 message is IPKLPSFHGQ. This is because  $O + T = I$ ,  $N + B = P$ ,  $E + F = K$ , etc. At the other  
21 end, the receiver “subtracts” the key sequence from the encrypted message to recover the  
22 original message.

23 6. An eavesdropper who does not know the key sequence cannot decrypt the  
24 message. There is no amount of computing power or mathematical theory that can change  
25 this fact.

1           7. The computer system is the same as the hand system, except that bits (0 and 1)  
2 are used instead of letters. The message bits are added to the key bits “modulo 2” to create the  
3 encrypted message:  $0 + 0 = 0$ ,  $0 + 1 = 1$ ,  $1 + 0 = 1$ ,  $1 + 1 = 0$ . The key bits are subtracted from  
4 the encrypted message to recover the original message.

5           8. To initialize the one-time pad, the sender and receiver meet and create a  
6 completely random stream of key letters (or bits). They can do this by flipping coins, rolling  
7 dice, etc. Both the sender and the receiver must keep copies of this key stream.

8           9. At a later time, when the sender wants to send a message, he encrypts it using the  
9 key stream previously generated and the algorithm described above. After doing so, he  
10 destroys the key stream and sends the message. The receiver uses the same key stream to  
11 recover the original message.

12           10. The eavesdropper cannot possibly break the encrypted message. Because every  
13 key sequence is equally likely, the eavesdropper has no information with which to analyze the  
14 encrypted message. To use the example above, assume that the eavesdropper recovered the  
15 message IPKLPSFHGQ. He has no way of knowing that the real key is TBFGRGFARFM and  
16 the real message is ONETIMEPAD. The key and message could be POYYAEAAZX and  
17 SALMONEGGS, or BXFGBMTMXM and GREENFLUID. Because all keys of the same  
18 length are equally likely, the eavesdropper cannot tell which one is correct. This same  
19 reasoning holds true for bits as it does for letters.

20           11. Although unsuitable for most applications, a one-time pad can be used in  
21 practice to guarantee secrecy of low-volume communication among small groups of people.  
22 As an illustration (reported to be a real example, but also valid as a hypothetical example), the  
23 one-time pad can be used to guarantee secrecy of “hot line” messages between the  
24 government leaders in Washington and Moscow.

