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But do they also kill people based on content?

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News (Bernstein–Bekkers–Lange): successful EM extraction of secrets from **constant-time software** running on **fast ARMs**.

SRAM data on fast ARM → EM → key recovery

SpecAn	Freq.	Amplitude
1	180.114 MHz	-64.98 dBm
2	192.005 MHz	-67.53 dBm
3	240.006 MHz	-69.56 dBm
4	186.004 MHz	-70.43 dBm
5	275.005 MHz	-70.67 dBm
6	114.002 MHz	-70.90 dBm
7	108.002 MHz	-71.08 dBm
8	144.004 MHz	-71.59 dBm
9	132.002 MHz	-72.24 dBm
10	265.947 MHz	-72.32 dBm



Arithmetic data on fast ARM → EM → key recovery